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— ABSTRACT —
In the present paper, I investigate the relation between the institution 
of obligatory child support and libertarianism, particularly a libertarian 
theory of distributive justice� I demonstrate that the institution of obliga-
tory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of 
distributive justice as represented by Murray N� Rothbard, Hans-Hermann 
Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella or Robert Nozick� However, the 
main research question that I address in the paper is: What construal of 
the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory 
child support compatible with? I hypothesise that obligatory child support 
is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted 
in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”, as represented by Israel M� Kirzner� 
To inquire into the main research problem, I employ the method of reflec-
tive equilibrium�
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IntRoduCtIon
It is commonly believed amongst libertarians that the institution of obligatory 
child support as an instance of uncontractual positive duty is incompatible 
with the fundamental tenets of the libertarian doctrine� As Walter Block puts 
* Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies�
91Łu﻿k﻿asz dominiak﻿: Libertarianism and Obligatory Child Support 
it, “a basic premise of libertarianism is that there are no positive obligations” 
(Block 2004: 275)� The strongest formulation of this ubiquitous idea concerning 
children’s rights was formulated by Murray Rothbard in his widely acclaimed 
book The Ethics of Liberty� Starting with the purely negative concept of right 
as an area of human action that no one is allowed to interfere with, Rothbard 
demonstrates that “any positive duty that coerces a man to perform an act for 
another’s sake is an infringement on the former’s liberty and property rights and 
as such is unacceptable in the free society”, hence “the parent should not have 
a legal obligation to feed, clothe, or educate his children, since such obligations 
would entail positive acts coerced upon the parent and depriving the parent of 
his rights” (Rothbard 1998: 100)� What is more, in the case of parents who do not 
want to work (or do not want to work so much) and generate income, the state 
forces them to work under a threat of property seizure and imprisonment what 
makes obligatory child support a form of involuntary servitude, i�e� “a condition 
in which the victim is forced to work for another by the use or threat of physical 
restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the 
legal process” (United States v. Kozminski, 1998)� This very feature of obligatory 
child support is what libertarianism opposes particularly vehemently� As Murray 
Rothbard says: “If there is anything a libertarian must be squarely and totally 
against, it is involuntary servitude – forced labor – an act which denies the most 
elemental right of self-ownership” (Rothbard 2002: 78)�
In the present paper, I investigate the following research question: What 
construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of 
obligatory child support compatible with? To solve my research problem, I first 
analyse the reasons for which obligatory child support is incompatible with the 
classical libertarian theory of distributive justice� I identify two main reasons 
of this incompatibility: 1) obligatory child support is not an instance of a duty 
that stems from creation of peril; 2) obligatory child support is not a contractual 
duty in a sense of the property title-transfer model of contracts� I claim that the 
background reason of this incompatibility is what I call the Conjoined Child 
Ownership Account that is presupposed by the classical libertarian theory of 
distributive justice� Hence, for obligatory child support to be compatible with 
libertarianism, the Conjoined Child Ownership Account has to be jettisoned and 
replaced with the Exclusive Child Ownership Account� This, however, is possible 
only if the libertarian theory of distributive justice is construed in an unorthodox 
way� The main thesis of this paper is then the following assertion: Obligatory child 
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support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted 
in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”�
To investigate my research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilib-
rium (Arras 2007: 46 – 71; Daniels 1979: 256 – 282; Daniels 2011, Dominiak 2012: 
143 – 156; Dworkin 2013: 185 – 222, Haslett 1987: 305 – 311, Rawls 1951: 177 – 197; 
Rawls 1999: 17 – 18)� Generally speaking, the method of reflective equilibrium 
aims at putting our considered judgements, principles and background theories 
into a state of coherence� However, since social institutions are embodiments 
of our beliefs, they also can correspond with theories, doctrines, or principles� 
In this sense, an institution can be compatible with doctrines or theories� Since 
“institutions are stable and recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington 1965: 
394), it follows from the concept of institution that the thesis of compatibility or 
incompatibility of a particular institution with a given theory or belief should 
not hinge on the incidental, extraordinary, whim-dependent or pathological 
behaviours that occur within the purview of an institution� Quite to the contrary, 
the analysis should focus on stable, recurrent, default and normal elements of 
an institution�
PosItIve dutIes, tHeoRY oF ContRaCts, 
and obLIGatoRY CHILd suPPoRt
In his seminal paper on the topic, The Law of Omissions and Neglect of Children, 
Williamson M� Evers considers four sorts of legal duties existing in Anglo-
American law in terms of which parents’ obligation to support their children 
could possibly be interpreted: a duty to help the government, a status-based 
duty, a duty that stems from creation of peril, and a contractual duty� According 
to the libertarian political philosophy, for a positive duty not to violate indi-
viduals’ rights it has to be either a duty that stems from creation of peril or 
a contractual duty� The first two types of duty are incompatible with libertarian-
ism for obvious reasons: 1� the government is either as such incompatible with 
anarcho-libertarianism or compatible only as a minimal government with the 
minarcho-libertarianism, i�e� in neither case duties to help the government are 
justified; 2� if you oblige A, who peacefully works in a given profession (or who 
adopts a given social role), to perform some positive actions he does not want to 
perform, you prevent him from pursuing this profession, and at the same time 
you prevent innumerable others from voluntarily dealing with A (employing A, 
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buying A’s services or goods, etc�); you thereby initiate aggression against A and 
innumerable others�
Hence, according to the libertarian political philosophy, for a positive duty 
not to violate individual rights it has to be either a duty that stems from crea-
tion of peril or a contractual duty� The first case, as far as it corresponds with 
the libertarian principles, presupposes that for a positive duty to occur, the 
obliged person has to put somebody in danger by committing an invasive act� 
As Williamson Evers points out, “the criminal law punishes persons who put 
into motion some force that invades individual rights and who then neglect 
to halt the force which they originally set in motion” (Evers 1978: 3)� If you 
push somebody into water, you have a positive duty to rescue him or you will 
be guilty not only of infringing upon his bodily inviolability (pushing him into 
water against his will) but also of homicide (if he drowns in effect of your already 
illicit act)� What is the basis of positive duties in these types of cases is that “the 
creator of the peril has effectively committed an invasive act” and that the obliged 
person is the same person as the person who has created the peril: “the duty of 
the perpetrator to aid the imperiled in such cases is to be distinguished from 
a more generalized duty that is sometimes advanced, namely, a duty of everyone 
to aid imperiled” (Evers 1978: 3), which is unjustified on libertarian grounds�
Some libertarians hold that bringing a child into being is a situation analo-
gous with putting this child into danger and so that it places positive duties on 
parents� Stephan Kinsella writes: “the libertarian could argue that the parent has 
various positive obligations to his or her children, such as the obligation to feed, 
shelter, educate, etc� The idea here is that libertarianism does not oppose ‘positive 
rights’; it simply insists that they be voluntarily incurred� One way to do this is by 
contract; another is by trespassing against someone’s property� Now, if you pass 
by a drowning man in a lake you have no enforceable (legal) obligation to try 
to rescue him; but if you push someone in a lake you have a positive obligation 
to try to rescue him� If you don’t you could be liable for homicide� Likewise, if 
your voluntary actions bring into being an infant with natural needs for shelter, 
food, care, it is akin to throwing someone into a lake� In both cases you create 
a situation where another human is in dire need of help and without which he 
will die� By creating this situation of need you incur an obligation to provide for 
those needs” (Kinsella 2006)�
Unfortunately, this analogy is entirely tenuous� First of all, for a positive duty 
that stems from creation of peril to take place, an invasive act or “trespassing 
against someone’s property” has to take place first� But getting pregnant is not 
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an invasive act� Nor is it “trespassing against someone’s private property”, since 
there is nobody yet whose private property could be trespassed: the child and its 
private property is only called into existence by getting pregnant; there is no child 
floating in the air whose private property is violated by getting pregnant� Second 
of all, as the Non-Identity Problem (Parfit 1987: 351 – 379; McMahan 2004: 
445 – 475; Glover 2004: 429 – 444; Steinbock 2011: 83 – 92; Singer 2011: 109 – 119; 
Dominiak 2013: 46 – 52) demonstrates, for this very child with its “natural needs 
for shelter, food, care”, the only option was either to exist with these needs or not 
to exist at all, and since we do not consider the life with needs not worth living 
or worse than non-existence, the analogy with “throwing someone into a lake” 
is again broken� By throwing someone into a lake you worsen his situation, 
otherwise he would not complain or there would be no issue at stake; by getting 
pregnant, on the other hand, you do not worsen anyone’s situation, you create 
life� Hence, obligatory child support cannot be justified as a duty that stems from 
creation of peril�
The second possibility is that obligatory child support could be an instance 
of a contractual duty� Unfortunately, this theory also meets insurmountable 
difficulties� Referring to the fact that “some persons believe that the obligation 
to support children stems from a contract or implied contract between the 
parents themselves or between the parents and children” (Evers 1978: 5), Evers 
claims that the attempt to interpret a duty to support one’s minor children as 
a contractual duty is implausible for two main reasons�
First of all, it is usually the case that people do not sign contracts to support 
their children, therefore what we can talk about here is just an implicit contract� 
But the problem with implicit contracts is that “deriving obligations from implicit 
contracts looks very much like simply imposing obligations on others by force� 
Then we are no longer talking about contract and consent but about might defin-
ing right” (Evers 1978: 7)�
Second of all, even if a contract to support one’s children were an explicit and 
formal one, no transfer of property title would take place in such a contract: “it 
should from the first be clear that no transfer of property title has occurred in 
such alleged contracts, and that therefore they should not be legally binding” 
(Evers 1978: 5)� From a libertarian point of view, as it is clearly expressed by 
Murray Rothbard in The Ethics of Liberty, for a contract to be binding it has to 
involve a real property transfer between parties� Mere promises and expectations 
cannot be legally binding, even if they assume a formal and explicit character� 
For a contract to bind, there has to be some property that one party conditionally 
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transfers to the other party so if the other party did not fulfil her part of the 
contract, she would be in an illegitimate possession of this property; in other 
words, she would initiate an invasion of the property rights, thereby creating 
a reason to seize her property as a compensation for the violation� Rothbard 
writes: “In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to 
fulfill it is an implicit theft of property� But this can only be true if we hold that 
validly enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been 
transferred, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means that 
the other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without the consent 
of the former (implicit theft)” (Rothbard 1998: 133)�
By the same token, for obligatory child support to be a contractual duty, there 
has to be first some property transfer to the payer of child support to legally 
oblige him to pay child support to the receiver� It means that child support 
would be obligatory in the libertarian social order if and only if it were the case 
that child-support avoider would thereby come to the position of being in an 
illegitimate possession of the obligee’s property� On the other hand, if we were to 
recognise a contractual duty of child support where there was no real transfer of 
property title involved, we would end up with “the promised expectations model 
or the present mixed content of the law of contracts” (Evers 1977: 5) that legally 
enforce promises and thereby violate people’s property rights�
Why enforcing promises violates people’s property rights? A person who 
makes a mere promise does not violate anyone’s property rights, does not initi-
ate aggression and thereby is not an aggressor; she merely enjoys her property 
rights to her vocal cords and brain� On the other hand, if we hold a person 
who is not an aggressor liable for breaking a promise and take of her property 
as a compensation to a promisee, we initiate aggression against the former’s 
property rights�
Hence, since if obligatory child support is to be a contractual duty, there 
has to be first some property transfer to the payer of child support, the question 
arises: What kind of property could it be and who would be the parties of child 
support contracts? The only natural candidate for the answer to the first part of 
the question is that this property would be the child itself� As to the second part 
of the question, there are two possibilities: either parents and children or only 
parents would be the parties of child support contracts�
If we construe child support contracts as contracts between parents and 
children, we fall into contradiction� Children cannot act as consenting agents 
until relatively late in their lives� Without the ability to act as consenting agents 
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they are unable to conclude contracts� The moment at which they acquire this 
ability is the moment at which they stop being children and so the moment at 
which paying child support to them is not logically possible any more� So, if we 
wanted child support contracts to be contracts between children and parents, we 
would make these contracts objectless by the very act of signing them� Even if 
one argued that this contradiction is only an apparent one, the fact that we could 
not conclude child support contracts until relatively late would utterly undermine 
the very idea and purpose of child support� This possibility is then excluded�
So, we are left only with the second possibility, namely, that these are parents 
who could be the parties of a child support contract� However, if we assume – as 
it is assumed in the current legal systems – that both parents are owners of the 
child, we end up with the promised expectation model of contracts� If both 
parents own the child, there is nothing which the child support payments could 
be exchanged for and the promised expectations model of contracts is the only 
option available to us� Imagine, for instance, a child support contract modelled 
on the actual child support law� Parents who consider securing their children’s 
material situation in the case of divorce oblige themselves to support financially 
their children in such a manner that the custodial parent will incur the costs of 
bringing them up whereas the non-custodial parent will transfer, let’s say, 20% 
of his income to the custodial parent in order to share 50% of the care costs 
with the custodial parent� Does any transfer of property titles between parties 
of the contract take place here? Of course not� The only transfer of property 
title is between parents and children� They transfer their property to children 
by supporting them, both before divorce and after it� But they do not transfer 
any property titles between each other� Hence, what we are dealing here with is 
a sheer promise: the mother promises the father to support their children in the 
case of divorce and the father does the same�
Therefore, it seems that the only possibility for obligatory child support to 
function as a contractual duty (as well as the only possibility for obligatory child 
support to be compatible with libertarianism) would be the situation in which 
only one of the parents would be the exclusive owner of the child� Then the 
owner could conclude a contract with the other parent stipulating, e�g�: “Hereby 
I transfer the title to half of my property in the child to the father and the father 
obliges himself to pay child support to me in exchange for the title”� However, 
can such a construal of child ownership (Exclusive Child Ownership Account) be 
justified within the libertarian political philosophy? This is the question of the 
libertarian theory of distributive justice�
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CLassICaL LIbeRtaRIan tHeoRY oF dIstRIbutIve JustICe 
and CHILd owneRsHIP
According to the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice, one can 
become a legitimate owner of a thing only in two ways: either by homesteading 
a previously (at the moment of homesteading) unowned thing (by mixing one’s 
labour with the thing, occupying it, transforming it, etc� – there is an ongoing 
debate as to the question of what homesteading consists in), or by receiving 
a previously owned thing through voluntary transfer from the previous owner 
(in exchange for something else or as a free gift)� As Robert Nozick points out, 
the appropriation of a holding may take place only in these two ways:
A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice 
in acquisition is entitled to that holding�
A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding�
No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2 
(Nozick 2014: 151)�
There are, thus, only two possible general ways in which the mother could 
become the exclusive owner of the child (a more radical thesis that the father 
could be the exclusive owner of the child seems utterly doomed to failure): 1� she 
could homestead the child; 2� she could receive it as a free gift or in exchange for 
something� To answer the question if the mother could be the exclusive owner 
of the child on the basis of the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice 
we have to analyse these two options in turn�
First, the mother cannot become the exclusive owner of the child by home-
steading (i�e� transforming, occupying or mixing her labour with) it since for 
homesteading to take place, the resources that are homesteaded (i�e� transformed 
into something else, occupied or mixed with labour) cannot be owned� Only 
when the resources are unowned one can homestead them� As Hans-Hermann 
Hoppe says, “the homesteading principle means the first-use-first-own rule 
regarding unowned, nature-given resources” (Hoppe 2006: 413 – 414)� Obvi-
ously, there are no previously unowned children floating in the air, waiting for 
somebody to homestead them� Quite to the contrary, children are produced 
from gametes that are already owned by both parents� So, the resources that are 
transformed into the child are already owned� Therefore, the mother cannot 
become the exclusive owner of the child by homesteading it�
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One could try to argue that it is possible that the father could abandon 
his gametes, thereby making them unowned, and that only then the mother 
would homestead the gametes and produce the child� That would be the case of 
becoming the legitimate exclusive owner of the child� Unfortunately, this reply is 
much weaker than it seems at first glance� Its weakness consists in not realising 
that in the libertarian social order children are also resources that can generate 
profits on their owner’s behalf� Therefore, the abandonment of children in the 
libertarian society, although theoretically possible, would be praxeologically 
improbable – the same as praxeologically improbable is the claim that people 
will start abandoning their real estates tomorrow� But let’s analyse this reply in 
detail�
As I mentioned above, in the libertarian social order there are no positive 
duties except duties that stem from creation of peril and contractual ones� By 
the same token, there are no duties connected with being a co-owner of the 
child except these two types� Therefore, the father who does not sign a child 
support contract can be a co-owner of the child and have no duties (no costs) 
connected with this ownership� On the other hand, if one wants to abandon one’s 
property, one has to notify others of this fact� As Walter Block points out, this 
necessity of notification “follows not from any positive obligation whatsoever, 
but rather from the logical implication of what it means to abandon something� 
You cannot (logically) abandon something if you do not notify others of its 
availability for their own ownership� At most, if you do not undertake any noti-
fication, you have not abandoned it, but rather are simply the absentee owner 
over it […] you are still the owner of it, and are (temporarily, for the moment, 
even for the rest of your life) not using it any more� You have, in a word, not 
yet succeeded in abandoning it� In other words, abandoning property is not 
something you can attain merely by wishing for it; merely by no longer using 
it; merely by no longer exercising the tradition ownership rights over it” (Block 
2004: 279)� Therefore, the father who wants to abandon his gametes has to notify 
others (the mother) of this fact� However, such a notification means extra costs� 
Therefore, by being a co-owner of the child, the father does not incur any costs, 
whereas by abandoning the gametes he incurs some extra costs� Hence, what 
the above reply essentially boils down to is the assertion that the father having 
a choice between two ways of not taking care of the child would choose the more 
expensive one� This sounds implausible� Moreover, taking into consideration the 
aforementioned fact that being a co-owner of the child can bestow profits on 
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the father (the mother might one day want to buy his part of the property title, 
the father can demand remunerations for agreeing to the mother’s decisions 
concerning the child, both parents can put the child up for paid adoption, etc�) 
whereas abandoning the gametes can involve extra costs (the father could one 
day change his mind as to the child ownership), the plausibility of this reply 
plummets drastically� Basically, because in the libertarian social order children 
are also resources, it is, generally speaking, better to have them than to abandon 
them� A father who would prefer to costly abandon his property instead of 
holding it, would be an extraordinary case that does not have a bearing on the 
question of institutional compatibility�
Second, it seems then that the mother could become the exclusive owner of 
the child via transfer of the gametes (or a part of the property title in the child) 
from the father� This is perfectly conceivable and even presupposed by the above 
argument: since children are resources, so do gametes; if the father does not 
want to have the child, he can sell his gametes (or his part of the property title 
in the child) to the mother (he can even make a gift)� What is though highly 
improbable is that the same man who just effectively demonstrated – by selling 
his property title in the child (or gametes) – that he does not want to have the 
child, would even though be willing to pay child support to the child/mother, 
i�e� would be willing to buy back the property title to the same child for his child 
support payments� Although it is theoretically possible, it is praxeologically 
improbable and makes the case for the claim that obligatory child support is 
compatible with libertarianism to hinge on the whims of protean individuals 
and extraordinary cases�
As this analysis proves, except extraordinary and highly improbable cases, 
the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice does not allow for the exist-
ence of the institution of obligatory child support� The reason for that is that 
classical libertarianism presupposes what I call the Conjoined Child Ownership 
Account� According to this account, a default (standard) situation is that both 
parents own the child� It can be the case that for some extraordinary reasons 
(for instance, the death of the father) only one parent would be the owner of the 
child, however normally, as far as the institution of family and child ownership 
is concerned, the Conjoined Child Ownership Account is valid and default theory 
of child ownership� This idea is confirmed by such outstanding libertarians as 
Murray Rothbard or Walter Block� According to Rothbard, when a child is born, 
“the parents – or rather the mother, who is the only certain and visible parent – as 
the creators of the baby become its owners” (Rothbard 1998: 99)� In turn, Block 
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points out that the mother does not homestead the child alone but “with a little 
initial help from the father” (Block 2004: 280)� Therefore, it has to be concluded 
that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical 
libertarian theory of redistributive justice� For the institution of obligatory child 
support to be compatible with libertarianism, the Conjoined Child Ownership 
Account has to be jettisoned� However, since this account is presupposed by the 
classical libertarian theory of distributive justice, then the whole theory would 
have to be reformulated� Is libertarianism capable of such a reformulation? This 
is the question of the alternative construal of the libertarian theory of distributive 
justice�
FIndeRs-CReatoRs etHIC, LIbeRtaRIan tHeoRY oF dIstRIbutIve 
JustICe, and CHILd owneRsHIP
In what way the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice has to be 
construed to allow for the Exclusive Child Ownership Account and compatibility 
between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism? I claim 
that such a construal can be provided by the Israel M� Kirzner’s theory of finders-
creators ethic and entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner 1997: 60 – 85; Kirzner 1973; 
Kirzner 1979; Kirzner 1985; Kirzner 1989)�
According to the finders-creators ethic, an entrepreneur or producer do 
not transform the existing resources but create them, or their value, ex nihilo� 
An entrepreneur – thanks to his intelligence, talent and labour – discovers 
a potential use of the existing resources and by implementing his discovery, he 
creates something, a resource or value, that did not exist before his discovery� 
Therefore, after an entrepreneurial discovery, there is both an old, previously 
existing resource, and a new one, created by the entrepreneur� Kirzner writes, 
“until a resource has been discovered, it has not, in the sense relevant to the 
rights of access and common use, existed at all� On this view it seems plausible 
to consider the discoverer (of the hitherto ‘non-existent’ resource) as, in the 
relevant sense, the creator of what he has found” (Kirzner 1981: 395 – 396)�
Hence, according to Israel M� Kirzner, next to the original acquisition of 
holdings and transfer of property, there is the third way of appropriating things: 
a creation� “It should be noted that ownership-by-creation is quite different from 
ownership-by-just-acquisition-from-nature� Ownership by acquisition occurs 
against the prior background of given unheld resources� Acquisition is, in fact, 
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a kind of ‘transfer’ (from nature to the first holder)� Ownership by creation, 
on the other hand, involves no notion of transfer at all� The finder-creator has 
spontaneously generated hitherto non-existent resources, and is seen, therefore, 
as their natural owner” (Kirzner 1981: 396)�
Imagine the following scenario� A lumberjack cuts down a tree that belongs 
to him� A carpenter comes into lumberjack’s timber without the latter’s consent 
and makes a wardrobe of this timber� Who is the owner of the wardrobe? On 
the basis of classical libertarian theory of distributive justice, it cannot be the 
carpenter since he violated both the principle of justice in transfer (lumberjack 
did not consent to the transfer of his timber to the carpenter) and the principle of 
justice in acquisition (timber was not an unowned resource)� As Stephan Kinsella 
points out, no libertarian would “hold that creating an item using raw material 
owned by others gives the thief-creator ownership of the item” (Kinsella 2008: 
39)� In turn, on the basis of the finders-creators ethic, it is the carpenter who is 
the owner of the wardrobe� Even though without the lumberjack’s labour and 
timber there would be no wardrobe – the same as without the carpenter’s work 
there would be no wardrobe either – the lumberjack cannot be the “creator” of 
the wardrobe in the sense of finders-creators ethic since he did not effectively 
discover a hitherto unknown use for timber (timber as a wardrobe); what he 
“created” is timber; he discovered a new use for a tree (tree as timber)� It is 
the carpenter who effectively discovered that timber can be the wardrobe and 
therefore he is the “creator” of the wardrobe�
The finders-creators ethic introduces, therefore, an alternative construal 
of the principle of homesteading� The classical libertarianism understands 
homesteading as appropriation of unheld resources� On the other hand, from 
the finders-creators ethic vantage point, the appropriation can also take place 
by “creation of an entirely new dimension of the holding – something not only, 
not previously held, but also something that did not, in the relevant sense, 
exist previously altogether” (Kirzner 1981: 402)� Hence, the classical libertarian 
theory of original acquisition is characterised by the “decided lack of enthusiasm 
for the possibility that many cases of original acquisition may qualify, at least 
in part, for justification under the finder-creator, finder-keeper ethic” (Kirzner 
1981: 402)�
Therefore, from the finders-creators ethic point of view, the carpenter, as the 
creator of the wardrobe, is as a matter of logic the first-comer to the wardrobe, 
the original appropriator of the wardrobe; before he created the wardrobe, there 
had not been the wardrobe yet to first come to or to homestead� Obviously, the 
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lumberjack still has property title to his timber� But on what basis should he has 
it to the wardrobe? Has he received it through the rightful transfer of holdings 
or through original acquisition of holdings? Before the carpenter made the 
wardrobe, there had not been this wardrobe yet for anyone to have property title 
to� Nor did the carpenter transfer property title to the wardrobe to the lumber-
jack� Of course, nothing of this sort happened in the first place either when the 
carpenter seized the lumberjack’s timber� But no one holds that the lumberjack 
lost thereby the property title to his timber� However, since there is no timber 
any more, only the wardrobe, the lumberjack has a right to be compensated for 
his timber (plus for all other negative consequences of unlawful action of the 
carpenter)� He has though no right to the wardrobe as such� As Kirzner points 
out, one can argue in objection to the finders-creators ethic “that if I discover 
new, hitherto unnoticed value in my neighbor’s property, that additional value 
ought, on the finders, keepers ethic, be mine without any transfer of property 
at all� To the extent that the ‘new value’ can be consumed without violating the 
rights of the neighbor, this seems not unreasonable� In general, where consump-
tion of the newly discovered value cannot occur without violating existing rights, 
it will be in the interest of the discoverer to buy up those rights, in order to enjoy 
the new values which he has discovered” (Kirzner 1981: 411)�
By the same token as in the lumberjack–carpenter thought experiment, even 
though without man’s labour and sperm there would be no child – the same as 
without mother’s labour and egg there would be no child either – a man cannot 
be the “creator” of a child since he does not effectively produce a new resource 
or value as far as his gametes are concerned; he does not create “an entirely new 
dimension of the holding – something not only, not previously held, but also 
something that did not, in the relevant sense, exist previously altogether”� What 
he creates is sperm; his body transforms other cells such as spermatogonia into 
sperm, adding thereby “an entirely new dimension” to his spermatogonia� It 
is a woman who transforms a sperm and egg into a child, adding thereby “an 
entirely new dimension” to gametes – “something not only, not previously held, 
but also something that did not, in the relevant sense, exist previously altogether”, 
and therefore it is a woman who is the “creator” of a child� Whatever the moment 
of the beginning of human life we assume on the continuum ranging from 
conception to birth, it is the labour of mother’s body that produces a child from 
the father’s and mother’s genetic material� Hence, as far as the finders-creators 
ethic is concerned it is the mother who is the creator of the child and thereby 
its exclusive owner�
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It is then clear that the finders-creators ethic presupposes the Exclusive 
Child Ownership Account� According to the Exclusive Child Ownership Account, 
it is not possible for a man to become an owner of a child in a “natural” way� 
On the basis of the finders-creators ethic and the Exclusive Child Ownership 
Account, contrary to contemporary political regimes, being the genetic father 
(or genetic mother) of the child has no bearing on the property title to the child� 
As I demonstrated above, what matters is who adds “an entirely new dimension” 
to the gametes, who transforms the genetic material into a child� In the case of 
natural pregnancy, it is always a genetic and biological mother and therefore 
she is the creator, the original appropriator of the child; in the case of in vitro 
fertilisation and surrogacy, it is, depending on the theory of the beginning of 
human life, a scientist or biological mother (not genetic one), unless a contract 
with the in vitro fertilisation clinic or surrogate mother stipulates otherwise� So, 
whatever the case, the genetic father of the child is not a “natural”, original owner 
of the child; he is a late-comer� Second of all, because a genetic father is a late-
comer who, regardless of his motives, beliefs or aspirations, cannot originally 
appropriate a child, there is only one legitimate possibility left for him as to the 
child ownership, namely, he can appropriate a child through transfer of holdings� 
Hence, the praxeological constraints that would be placed on the genetic parents 
by the finders-creators ethic and the Exclusive Child Ownership Account would 
determine “stable and recurring patterns of behavior”, according to which if 
a man wants to have a child, he has to receive property title to a child from its 
mother who is its exclusive original appropriator� It means that whatever man’s 
motives and beliefs are, receiving the property title to a child from its mother 
would constitute for him an inevitable means if he wanted to achieve an end 
of having a child� Since a man could acquire property title to a child from the 
mother only in one of the two ways: 1) he could receive it as a gift; 2) or he could 
exchange it for his property, the second scenario would of course be the case 
of the spontaneous emergence of obligatory child support� Although the exact 
and detailed form that obligatory child support would adopt under conditions 
of unorthodox libertarianism is beyond our comprehension, we can predict 
with a perfect certitude that if it developed, it would function as an exchange of 
property titles between the mother and a man�
Because, as I mentioned earlier on, the only possibility for obligatory child 
support to function as a contractual duty, as well as the only possibility for obliga-
tory child support to be compatible with libertarianism, is the situation in which 
just one of the parents is the exclusive owner of the child, it is now obvious that 
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on the basis of the unorthodox libertarian theory of distributive justice (finders-
creators ethic), it is perfectly possible for obligatory child support to function as 
an explicit contractual duty in accordance with the property title-transfer model 
of contracts� If the mother is the exclusive owner of the child, she can transfer 
her property title in the child to a man in exchange for man’s property title to his 
money (or other property); as a result of the transfer, he becomes a co-owner of 
the child and she appropriates his child support payments� Hence, Williamson 
M� Evers’ criticism “that no transfer of property title occurs in such alleged con-
tracts, and that therefore they are not legally binding” is valid only as far as we 
espouse the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice and the Conjoined 
Child Ownership Account: if a child is originally co-owned by the parents, there 
is nothing to exchange the child support payments for� But as far as we espouse 
the unorthodox libertarian theory of distributive justice (finders-creators ethic) 
and the Exclusive Child Ownership Account, Evers’ criticism does not apply�
ConCLusIons
In this paper, I analysed the problem of compatibility between the institution of 
obligatory child support and libertarianism� I demonstrated that the institution 
of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory 
of distributive justice since the latter presupposes the Conjoined Child Ownership 
Account� If children were naturally a property of both parents, child support 
contracts would degenerate into promised expectations model of contracts which 
is inconsistent with the libertarian doctrine� On the other hand, the institution 
of obligatory child support is compatible with the unorthodox libertarian theory 
of distributive justice, namely with the finders-creators ethic� According to this 
approach, the mother is the creator of the child and thereby its exclusive owner� It 
is then possible for child support contracts to function within the property title-
transfer model of contracts� Therefore, the main thesis of the paper, namely that 
obligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive 
justice interpreted in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”, has been confirmed�
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